ABSTRACT Cyber-physical-social (CPS) systems integrate Big Data Collectors (BDCs), Service Organizers (SOs) and users to build a unified data-centric computing framework. In CPS systems, BDCs leverage a vast variety of sensing devices to collect cyber-physical-social data, and report these data to SOs to orchestrate various services provided to users, thus offering a great potential for solving complex network tasks that are far beyond the capabilities of existing networks. However, due to the lack of an economic model to describe such complex data interactions, their applications are limited. So, a game-based economic model is proposed in this paper to make smart price decisions in CPS systems. Specifically, it has the following innovations: (a) The economic model gives a dynamic game income matrix which can accurately describe the revenue changes of BDCs in the game, so as to help BDCs select appropriate game parameters and strategies, and make BDCs competitive in the game. (b) The economic model can help SOs to make optimized data purchase price and service selling price based on data collection cost and competitor price analysis, so that SOs can have a better Quality of Service (QoS) and users attraction, and maximize the profit. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed model can help BDCs and SOs find the most suitable game strategy and price adjustment principle, which has great significance in applications.
technologies, social media and large-scale computing infrastructures have produced a variety of cyber-physical-social data, e.g., Twitter/WeChat posts, human mobility, car trajectories, phone calls [2] , [34] [35] [36] . Cyber-physical-social (CPS) system integrates Big Data Collectors (BDCs), Service Organizers (SOs) and users to build a unified data-centric computing system, and offer a great potential for solving complex network tasks that are far beyond the capabilities of existing networks [1] , [37] .
SOs, BDCs and users construct a huge and complex interaction network, and price competition exists among them [38] [39] [40] . Proper economic mechanism design will go hand-in-hand with technology advances in solving complex price competition issues in CPS systems [41] , [42] . Thus, researchers expect to establish a suitable economic model to describe this complex price competition system. In such big data based information services system, issues that people care include: (1) The price competition between SOs and users [42] , [43] . For SOs, the main issue is the price decision made for the service provided for users. Obviously, if SOs adopt a lower service price, then more users will be attracted, but the profit after deducting the cost will be reduced. Otherwise, if their revenue is not enough to offset the cost, the balance of the system will be invalidated. ( 2) The price competition between SOs and BDCs [27] , [44] . BDCs get reward by gathering and reporting data samples to SOs. Therefore, if rewards provided by SOs for data samples are too high, the enthusiasm of BDCs is high, SOs can collect enough data samples, but the profit is less. Conversely, if the reward is too low, BDCs are reluctant to participate in data collection because of insufficient incentives, it is difficult for SOs to collect sufficient data samples.
So, it is appropriate to use an economic model to describe the interaction between BDCs, SOs and users in CPS systems [21] , [45] , [46] , so that the decision-makers can adopt the optimized pricing strategy to control the network interaction and achieve maximum benefit. The advantage of using the price competition model is that: before investing in a complex network, it is possible to predict when the network will reach the equilibrium point, and the optimized values of parameters of the SOs, BDCs and users under balanced conditions, such as the payment of the data samples made by SOs, the price of the services, the number of samples to be collected and the QoS indicators of services. What's more, the economic model can also predict the revenue of the system, such as the total payment and payoff. These indicators are significant for SOs in terms of their total investment budget and expected return. Similarly, it is also possible for BDCs and users to provide a variety of important optimized parameters, so as to guide the network to adopt effective pricing and interaction strategies to enhance its effectiveness. These all indicate that an economic model design for the price decision of CPS system is of great significance.
Price competition between SOs and users was previously studied by Walrand. Maximizing profit is the most concerned issue of SOs, which might be achieved by setting a higher price for users and a low investment on the infrastructure. On the other hand, price competition models mainly includes Cournot and Bertrand models [47] .
Price competition between SOs and BDCs is the reward issue that SOs pays for the data samples provided by BDCs. The commonly used model is the Stackelberg game model [48] , [49] . In this model, a SO (leader) first publishes its own reward, while other SOs adjust their reward to optimize their earnings based on the published price of the leader. In this competition model, if a SO takes the lead in improving its reward, BDCs will choose to report data to the SO with a high price. As a result, other SOs cannot collect data, or the amount of collected data is reduced, forcing other SOs to follow the increase of reward, which is the relationship of the so-called leader-follower.
Auction and game mechanism are mechanisms often used [43] . Reverse auction is the most used mechanism between SOs and BDCs. Reverse auction refers to the existence of a buyer and many potential sellers of the auction form. In a reverse auction, the buyer will present the data it wants, and then waits for sellers that hold the corresponding data. Potential sellers continue to call out the lower price until there is no more sellers calling for a lower price. In CPS system, SOs are buyers, BDCs are sellers, SOs publish tasks of collecting data, and BDCs get reward by collecting data. Finally, SOs select the lowest quoted group of BDCs as winners and pay the reward. The reverse auction incentive is a subset selection, that is, the server platform chooses the BDCs subset with minimum payment cost under the premise of maximizing utility.
Although there are quite a few researches on price competition [39] [40] [41] [42] , most of them focus on the price competition between SOs and users. In such SOs-Users model, the data pricing process is relatively simple, and there have been a lot of researches and achieved considerable results. Some studies have given the price competition model between SOs and BDCs, and also described the competition relationship between BDCs, which has important significance. However, the current researches have the following shortcomings: (1) In most studies, the three components of CPS system are studied separately, making the results obtained difficult to apply to the actual network system. In fact, the whole network system is composed of SOs, BDCs and users, so the three components should be studied as a whole to get a realistic result when building the price competition model. However, in many studies, some only focus on the price competition model between SOs-Users, and others only consider the price competition model between SOs-BDCs. To the best of our knowledge, there is no competition model considering the game among BDCs-SOs-Users simultaneously. Obviously, there is a counterproductive relationship between the three and the interior. For example, when SOs improve the reward of BDCs, the cost of SOs increases, but at the same time, the data samples collected by them increase, so the QoS of their services increases [50] , [51] . The improvement of QoS can attract more users. In this case, choosing the optimized reward can make the whole system more efficient, but if only view from the competition between SOs-BDCs, it is harmful to improve the reward of BDCs. This shows that there is a complex joint competition relationship between the three, and it is necessary to model the price competition between the three parties simultaneously by analyzing these linkage influences in depth, and only consider the competitive relationship of any two does not reflect the actual complex system. (2) In the past, the economic model of such complex systems often only modeled quantitatively, but did not consider the quality of service, and thus seriously affected the validity of the model, making the established model only a purely theoretical economic model and cannot be applied to actual complex networks. For example, When SOs are pricing the data samples collected by BDCs, the unified pricing economic model can't achieve good results. Because the time and place of data samples will affect the QoS that SOs synthesize. For those areas where the number of sensing devices is large and the data samples already collected are sufficient, adding data samples does not improve the QoS of the services, but increases the cost of data acquisition. At this time, improving the reward of the areas with few data samples can effectively improve the overall efficiency of the network.
Therefore, it is urgent to establish a solid economic model to depict the complex price competition between the three components. So, a game-based economic model is proposed to portray the complex competition between BDCs-SOsUsers. The main contributions of this work are as follows:
(1) An economic model is proposed in this paper, which can simulate the dynamic price competition and data interaction in CPS systems, including the game between BDCs, the price competition between SOs-BDCs and SOs-Users. For BDCs, this model can help them be competitive in games by adjusting parameters such as trust level, cooperative correction rate and game frequency. And a dynamic game matrix is given by improving the classical game matrix, which can reflect the game income changes of BDCs. For SOs, they can find the optimized initial data collection price and service selling price by considering the data collection cost and QoS to ensure the maximum profit under the price and QoS competition mechanism of users.
(2) Smart price decisions for SOs and BDCs can be obtained under the model, which can ensure SOs and BDCs have a suitable initial data collection price, service selling price and game payment under given network conditions. At the same time, according to the specific game and competition process, the corresponding price adjustment algorithm is given in this paper. In the process of competition, SOs and BDCs continue to reduce their own costs while increasing their selling prices to increase their own profits under the guranting of their customers' attractiveness. After a certain period of price adjustment, prices of SOs and BDCs are gradually approaching the equilibrium point, so that the total profit of the participants and the system maintenance are in a stable state. In addition, we adopt a spatially differentiated price setting mechanism. For regions with a small number of BDCs, we increase their prices to enhance the enthusiasm of BDCs, thus ensuring the Qos of SOs' services. For regions with more BDCs, we lower their prices to reduce the cost of SOs.
(3) Simulation experiments demonstrate that under the economic model proposed in this paper, CPS system participants such as SOs and BDCs can find the most suitable game strategy and price decison under this model, which makes the participants in the system in an advantage competition.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II, the network model are presented. Then, the game based data pricing model of BDCs is introduced in Section III. The dynamic network pricing of SOs is given in Seciton IV. Simulation results are presented in Section V. Finally, Section VI provides conclusions and future work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT A. SYSTEM MODEL
The system model of this paper is depicted in Figure 1 , involving in three roles: Users, Service Organizers (SOs) and Big Data Collectors (BDCs). (1) Users, i.e. consumers or customers, consist of service applications or smart mobile terminals. Users request services from SOs by giving corresponding payment. (2) Service Organizers, also called Service Providers (SPs) in Cloud Networks, Service Publishers in Named Data Networking, which are composed of network devices with mass storage and powerful computing capabilities. SOs purchase metadata collected by BDCs, then orchestrate these data to more comprehensive and advanced services for selling to users, at the same time get payoff from users. (3) Big Data Collectors. BDCs consist of numerous data acquisition devices, including smart phones, laptops, cameras, smart cars, smart homes and surveillance probes etc. [27] , [40] , [52] , [53] . These devices sense surrounding environment in real time.
Data interaction and price competition among users, SOs and BDCs are complicated and flexible. Data gathering is performed periodically. Firstly, SOs determine data content and quantity to be collected in the next round according to the revenue in the previous round, and publish data collection VOLUME 7, 2019 tasks outside. Then, BDCs determine whether to participate in data collection tasks based on the price made by SOs and the possible data collection costs. BDCs participating in data collection report the perceived data to SOs and obtain corresponding payment. At the same time, they bear data gathering costs. After SOs get data from BDCs, they compose these data into services and sell them to users to earn profit. As illustrated in Figure 1, 1 . In this way, they can not only have their own data, but also get data of the other, and then report these data to SOs to gain more payment. Of course, when they get data from the other, they need to pay for the obtained service. The game where both parties take ''cooperate'' action is called cooperate game [42] . In the second case, as shown by BDC 2 and BDC N3 , BDC 2 gives Data [2] to BDC N3 , but BDC N3 does not comply with the requirement to give payment for the received data. So BDC 2 gives the data, but does not get any revenue, resulting in it only bear costs in the game, while BDC N3 obtains data without any cost. This game where one side takes ''cooperate'' strategy while the other side takes ''defect'' strategy is called half cooperate game. Sometimes there is no data interaction occurs between two BDCs, that is, no game occurs, then two BDCs cannot receive any additional data or benefits.
The standardized system model is defined as follows. Suppose there are N1 users, N2 SOs and N3 BDCs in the system, the set of users is U, U = {User1, User2, . . . , UserN1}, the set of SOs is O, O = {SO 1 , SO 2 , . . . ,SO N2 }, and the set of BDCs is B, B = {BDC 1 , BDC 2 , . . . ,BDC N3 }. B. GAME STRATEGY The 1-step memory mechanism is adopted in this paper, where each participant keeps the record of the last game, and determine the behavior and strategy adopted in the next game based on the 1-step game history [27] , [42] . In this mechanism, the game participants are two, and there are two kinds of game actions. The initiator is the party who initiates the game, the opponent who participates in the game is called responder. Both initiator and responder can choose ''cooperate'' or ''defect'' action in the game, and the ''cooperate'' action is coded into ''1'', the ''defect'' action is coded into ''0''. Assuming that BDC a and BDC k represent the initiator and responder respectively, then four types of historical interactions are obtained, which are represented as 00 (BDC a defects, BDC k defects), 01 (BDC a defects, BDC k cooperates), 10 (BDC a cooperates, BDC k defects), 11 (BDC a cooperates, BDC k cooperates). According to the game actions (cooperate or defect) under four historical interactions, 16 different combinations (2 4 = 16) are obtained [27] , [42] , as shown in Table 1 . Each game player can only choose one of the 16 strategies in a game, and different strategies can be chosen in different games.
The meaning of the above model is that two participants can choose any one of the above 16 strategies to form a combination, and then play the game according to the corresponding payment matrix of the game model. After the game is completed, the gains and losses of two participants are calculated. Then, based on results of the last game, the next game is played. The game strategy is adjusted according to the income of the last game. Repeating gaming several rounds, then calculate the gains and losses of these games. In Table 1 , there are four typical one-step memory strategies commonly used to perform dynamic games, namely ALL-C, ALL-D, TFT, and WSLS. All-C means that both initiator and responder take ''cooperate'' action in the next game without reference to the historical game result, the ALL-C is coded into ''1111''. Contrary to ALL-C, ALL-D means that the ''defect'' action is always taken in the next game regardless of the last game, and the encoding is represented as ''0000''. TFT, the Tit for Tat strategy, starts with the ''cooperate'' action and then adopts the principle of treating people with their own ways. That is, each time the initiator repeats the action of the responder in last game. The TFT strategy is coded into ''1010''. WSLS, the ''win-stay, lose-shift'' strategy, which is a learning process based on the outcome of the last game. Assuming that the participant made a profit in the last game, it still uses the same strategy in the next game (cooperate-cooperate or defect-defect). Conversely, if the participant loses in the last game, then it uses the opposite action in the next game (cooperate-defect or defect-cooperate). WSLS is coded into ''1001''.
Suppose that there are K participants in the system, each participant chooses one of the 16 strategies as its game strategy. If the number of participants of the i-th strategy is N i , then the number of participants of 16 strategies is represented as
For the i-th strategy, its proportion of participants is N i K . After the system is stable, the strategy with the largest proportion is highlighted. It indicates that the strategy is superior to other strategies in the game, that is, it makes participants maximize profits since participants often take the most gainful strategy.
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The research goal of this paper is to seek a game-based dynamic network pricing model, which can simulate the price decision process in the real world and ultimately maximize profits of network participants such as SOs and BDCs.
For SOs, their profits come from the difference of prices from buying data from BDCs at low prices and selling services to users at high prices. When obtaining data from BDCs, if SOs give few data gathering returns, it cannot arouse the BDCs' interest in collecting data. As a result, the actual quantity and quality of data collected cannot reach the expected level. However, if the price set by SOs is too high, SOs bear too much costs, which makes SOs get low profits or even losses. The same situation exists when SOs make the selling price of a service. Therefore, the key to SOs is to find an optimized price to make the buying price of the data and the selling price of the service reach a relative balance point, thereby maximizing the total profits.
Assuming that in the i-th round, SO a pays β for a data, the amount of data that SO a purchases from BDCs is d . These data are combined into s services, each service is sold to users at price λ, and the cost in processing data into services is φ, then the gains of SO a in the i-th round is:
Users use a price and quality competition mechanism to purchase services, and the payoff given by users is the sole income of SOs. Therefore, it's important to ensure that each service of SOs is sold as much as possible. Then, the quantity and quality of data owned by SOs become critical. The more data of different Area of Interest (AoI) that SOs have, the richer the data content is, the better the quality of services SOs provide, but at the same time the greater costs they bear. Therefore, the data amount collected by their respective AoI is required to be reasonable. Assuming that the number of metadata expected to be collected for SO a in the i-th area is Z i e , the actual number of metadata collected for SO a in this area is Z i , when the actual data amount is closer to the expected value, SO a can achieve a balance between quality and overhead. The difference between the actual data collection quantity and the expected data collection quantity is calculated as follows:
For BDCs, their revenue come from two aspects, one is the return of collecting data for SOs, and the other is the benefit obtained in the game process. Suppose that in the i-th round, the number of data collected by BDC k is c , the return of reporing a data to SOs is β, the corresponding collection cost of the data is c, then the revenue of BDC k in data gathering is:
The income of BDCs in game process is derived from gains generated by data received in the game, but at the same time, they also pay for the received data. Suppose that in the i-th game, the revenue generated by data obtained by BDC k is ω i , the cost of BDC k paid for the received data is µ i , and BDC k games a total of M times in the i-th round, then the revenue of BDC k in the round is:
Therefore, the total profit of BDC k in the i-th round is:
In summary, the research objectives are as follows:
III. GAME BASED DATA PRICING OF BDCS
In CPS systems, BDCs collect data for SOs and game with other BDCs to gain more data. For BDCs, the payment obtained by reporting data is made by SOs. Therefore, the pricing of BDCs refers to the data pricing in the game.
In this section, we first analyse the game-related parameters such as trust degree and cooperation correct rate. Then, a dynamic revenue matrix is proposed to describe the income changes in the game by improving the classical game matrix. And the game frequency and strategy of participants are adjusted based on the earnings in the previous game. Finally, a complete game and price adjustment algorithm is given.
A. GAME RELATED PARAMETERS
The game we discussed in this paper is a classic 2 * 2 game with participants limited to 2, the two players are initiator VOLUME 7, 2019 and responder. Before the game begins, the game initiator will choose a initial game strategy from 16 strategies given in Table 1 , and then the initiator selects a BDC as the game opponent, i.e. responder. In previous researches, the opponents of the game are mostly arbitrarily chosen, and this randomly generated responders make the game results have great uncertainty. Responders are more likely to betray in the game, which causes the initiator to bear the game loss alone. Then, after several games, the initiator will die due to the game losses. The death of BDCs will result in the lack of data collection in some areas of the network, thus greatly affecting the data collection quality of SOs. Therefore, in this paper, the initiator chooses the game opponent no longer adopts the stochastic principle, but is based on the trust degree and distance difference of candidate nodes. Trust level indicates the situation in which BDCs keep their promises in previous games. Obviously, if a BDC has defected many times in previous games, the BDC is more likely to betray the initiator in this game. So, the initiator chooses a BDC with a certain reputation as the responder. The trust level of BDCs is is continuously updated with the increase of game times. When the network initializes, the trust level of all BDCs defaults to 1. If a BDC adopts the ''defect'' action in the game, its trust level is reduced. Conversely, if the BDC takes the ''cooperate'' action in the game, its trust level is increased. However, the upper bound of the trust value is 1 and the lower bound is 0. When the trust level reaches the maximum or minimum value, its value can only be adjusted in the opposite direction. If a BDC adopts the ''ALL-C'' strategy, then it always takes the cooperate action in the game, its trust degree will always be 1. If a BDC adopts the ''ALL-D'' strategy, its trust level is 0. Therefore, for each BDC k in the network, its trust level after i-th game is as follows:
where T k i−1 represents the trust level of BDC k in the last game (i-1-th game), ''a i = 1'' means that BDC k adopts the cooperate action in the i-th game, ''a i = 0'' indicates that BDC k takes the defect action in the i-th game, α and b are reward and penalty coefficients respectively, with values ranging from 0 to 1, depending on the expected adjustment range for each time.
Distance difference is the spatial distance between two game participants. In a data collection network, the data collected by BDCs in the same geographical area during the same time period often has strong similarity and redundancy. If the initiator chooses a game opponent that is farther away from it, it will increase the richness and comprehensiveness of the data, and also enhance its competitiveness in SOs. Therefore, we consider the distance difference when selecting the game opponent. Assume the network coordinates of the initiator and the responder are (x i , y i ),(x r , y r ), and ð the distance weight coefficient, when choosing a game opponent, the more attention is paid to the distance, the larger the value of ð. The Euclidean distance is used to measure their distance difference, then the calculation is as follows:
Therefore, assuming BDC a is an initiator, for any BDC k in the set of candidates, its probability to be selected as the opponent of BDC a is:
During the game, both initiator and responder can choose to cooperate or betray. The probability that the participants may cooperate with the opponent during the game is called the cooperation rate. Assuming BDC a games with BDC k , and BDC a wants to get the data of BDC k in the game, then BDC k is more likely to cooperate with BDC a when the higher the payment is given by BDC a . Conversely, if BDC a gives a low payment, then the cooperation rate of BDC k will decrease and the rate of betrayal will increase. In Table 1 , based on the 1-step memory principle, we give the next behavior of the players in the 16 strategy. Under these strategies, the cooperation and betrayal of the participants is determined. But in the actual game process, the participants will make decisions based on the payment given by the other party. Therefore, based on the original 1-step memory principle, we adjust the game behavior of game participants according to the data pricing of game opponent. When the price made by BDC a deviates significantly from the selling price given by SOs and the cost of collecting data of BDC k , BDC k may change the original cooperation to betrayal. For each BDC k , cooperative correction rate is calculated as follows:
Among them, β d is the reward obtained by reporting the data to SOs, ω d is the payment given by the game opponent for the data, c is the cost of collecting the data, is the constant coefficient, and the probability of correcting the cooperative behavior is mainly based on the deviation of ω d from β d and c.
B. PAYOFF MATRIX OF GAME
The game revenue of BDC a and BDC k are shown in Table 2 . If both BDC a and BDC k adopt the ''cooperate'' strategy, they not only have their own data, but also get the data of the other. Suppose that the income obtained by reporting the data of the other is β, and the payment give to the other for the received data is µ, then the benefit of BDC a and BDC k in the game is β − µ. If BDC k adopts the ''cooperate'' strategy and BDC a adopts the ''defect'' strategy, BDC k does not obtain the data of BDC a in the game, but it also bears the game cost µ, so the revenue of BDC k is -µ. And BDC a betraies BDC k , so it can get β without any cost, its income is β. On the contrary, if BDC a adopts the ''cooperate'' strategy and BDC k adopts the ''defect'' strategy, the benefit of BDC a is -µ, and the benefit of BDC k is β. Finally, if both BDC a and BDC k adopt the ''defect'' strategy, no data interaction occurs between them, so their game revenue are 0.
The traditional game matrix above can represent the income of participants under different game behaviors, but there are some problems. First, the above game matrix cannot reflect the real game changes. In the traditional game, the benefit of players in the game is the same once the participant confirms the game strategy, the proceeds are static. In fact, in the actual game, both the initiator and the responder do not use this static game matrix, instead, the game matrix is dynamically adjusted according to the actual situation of the game to seek more profits. Secondly, the network participants have the characteristics of ''draw on the advantages and avoid disadvantages'', so the player will not give the data to the opponent without any benefit, and bear the loss of the game alone. Obviously, the above matrix does not consider these issues.
Therefore, we improve the above matrix to propose a dynamic revenue matrix to describe the real game scenario. In the improved model, each participant publishes its revenue matrix before the game begins, that is, let the game opponent know the payment that it can pay for the received data. Then in the actual game process, it adjusts the game payment according to the specific situation to maximize its profit. Suppose the payment BDC a promises to pay for the received data is µ com , the rewards obtained by reporting data to SOs is β, and the cost of the game is q, then the initial value of µ com made by BDC a should satisfy the following relationship:
Only when µ com < β − q, BDC a can make profit in the game. The price decision of µ com is a tradeoff of multi parties. Higher µ com can attract more BDCs, but at the same time SOs pay more game costs. The lower µ com can increase the revenue the SOs, but it will reduce the competitiveness in the market and increase the betrayal probability of the opponent. Therefore, a suitable initial value of µ com is important. Based on Eq. (11), the initial setting of µ com is as follows:
where ϑ is a constant coefficient. In the initial game, ϑ is set to a larger value. Then, the value of µ com is continuously decreased to increase the total profit of BDC a until the decrease of µ com cannot increase the profit. It indicates that the value of µ com has reached an equilibrium point. The adjustment of µ com is based on the profit in the previous game. Assuming that in the i-th round, the benefit that BDC a obtained is i , the total benefit of BDC a in the previous round is i−1 , then the adjustment function of µ com during the game is as follows:
Among them, K is the velocity correction of µ com , the larger the value of K, the greater the price change, the smaller the value of K, the more stable the price adjustment.
As with the data pricing in the above game, the payment β obtained by BDCs when reporting data to SOs is also adjusted with the increase of game times. However, the adjustment of β is determined by SOs, so we discuss it in Section IV. Assume that the adjustment function of β in the game is A β (see Section IV. Part A for the specific calculation), then the improved game matrix is shown in Table 3 .
Same as in Table 2, in Table 3 we denote the cooperate of the game participants as ''1'' and the defect as ''0'', and there are four game combinations, which are represented by ''00'', ''01'', ''10'', ''11''. We introduced two price adjustment functions A β and A µ to describe the dynamics of payments. Suppose that BDC k cooperates and BDC a defects, it means that BDC k gives its data to BDC a , and BDC a betrayed it and does not give it a promised payment, so BDC a can obtain the rewards βA β of reporting data, and bear the game cost q, but it does not give the payment for the received data. Note that in the improved matrix we consider the game cost, and the game cost is shared by both parties. BDC k suffers betrayal from BDC a , so it has no gains, and also bears the game cost q. And based on the previous game results, BDC k no longer request data from BDC a , and there is no need to give payment. The game between them is a half cooperative game. As can be seen that the revenue of the game participants in Table 2 is constantly changing with the game, which is in line with the real games.
C. ADJUSTMENT OF GAME FREQUENCY AND STRATEGY
Game frequency is the number of games BDCs play in one round. After each round, each BDC calculates its game profit in the last round. If its revenue is higher than the average revenue of all BDCs or its neighbors, it means that the BDC is in a competitive advantage in the game. Therefore, in the VOLUME 7, 2019 next round, its game frequency is increased to make more profit. On the contrary, if the profit of a BDC is lower than the average revenue of all BDCs or neighbors, it indicates it is at a competitive disadvantage in the game and reduces its game frequency.
Assume that the game frequency of BDC a in the last round (i-1 th round) is D i−1 , and the game profit in the last round is i−1 , the average profit of all BDCs in the last round is¯ a i−1 , the average profit of its neighboring BDCs in the last round is¯ n i−1 . then the game frequency of BDC a in i-th round is calculated as follows:
Based on the game profit of BDCs in the last round, we also adjust the game strategy. If the profit of BDC a is lower than the average profit of all BDCs, it means that the game strategy adopted by it is not suitable for the current game situation, so another strategy is adopted in the next round of game. If the profit of BDC a is higher than the average profit of all BDCs, it uses the same game strategy in the next round. The game strategy adjustment of BDCs adopts the replicator principle. Assuming that BDC a is the node to adjust the strategy, then under this principle, we calculate the probability that the corresponding strategy of each neighbor node is copied by BDC a according to their game profit. If the profit of the neighbor BDC is lower than the profit of BDC a , the probability that the strategy is copied by the BDC a is 0. If it is higher than BDC a , the probability is calculated based on their profit. In general, the higher the profit of the neighbor node, the more likely its strategy is copied by BDC a . Assume that the game strategy adopted by BDC k is Str 
The complete game and pricing process consists of three phases. First, in the initial stage of the game, each game participant determines its initial game strategy, which is randomly selected by the participants or assigned by the system. Then the participants choose the game opponent based on the trust degree and spatial difference. In the game phase, each BDC first formulates an initial payment for the data of the other, then determines the game behavior (cooperate or defect) according to the game strategy and the opponent's price. After a game is completed, the trust level of each node is updated, and its price µ com is adjusted according to its income in the last game. After each round of game, the average revenue of the nodes and the network is compared, and the game frequency and game strategy of BDCs in the next round in computed. The specific algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
For each BDC, its game frequency is D, and the parameter needs to be adjusted in each game is n, then the algorithm complexity is O(nQ), where n is a constant. It can be seen that the complexity of algorithm 1 is in a linear level. 
Algorithm 1 Game and Price

IV. DYNAMIC NETWORK PRICING OF SOs
In this section, we focus on the dynamic network pricing of SOs, including data collection pricing between SOs and BDCs and service pricing between SOs and Users. The data collection price refers to the payment given by SOs for the data collected by BDCs. Service pricing refers to the payment that users pay for services provided by SOs. Service pricing and data collection price are mutually influential. SOs set the service price based on the cost of data collection, and at the same time determines the data collection quantity and price according to the actual sales of services. In this section, we present the initial settings for data collection pricing and service pricing, and establish dynamic adjustment functions for two prices.
A. DATA COLLECTION PRICING OF SOs
To ensure the quality of data collection, we take a spatially differentiated data collection method in this paper. Before SOs publish the data collection task, they allocate the data collection tasks according to the number of surviving BDCs and the income of each Area of Interest (AoI, data collection area) in the last round. Therefore, the number and price of data collection in different regions are different. Suppose the number of data to be collected in the i-th area is Z i e , the total number of data to be collected by SOs in this round is tot , there are N A Area of Interest (AoI), and the number of surviving BDCs corresponding to each area is sur , then the calculation of Z i e is as follows:
where σ is a correction coefficient, which is determined by the income generated by the region in the last round. The larger the income of the area, the larger the value of σ is. It can be seen from Eq. (16) that under the same income, when the number of BDCs corresponding to the region is larger, the more data is allocated by the data; when the number of surviving BDCs is same, the region with higher income can get more data collection tasks, which is in line with the reality. Then, the data collection price is based on the amount of data collected and the number of surviving BDCs. If the number of surviving BDCs in the region is large, and the amount of data collected by it is less, then we lower the data collection price. Conversely, if the number of BDCs in a area is small but the amount of data to be collected is large, we increase the data collection price, and the larger the difference between the two, the greater the increase or decrease. Suppose that the data collection price given by SOs is β, the data collection amount in the i-th data collection area is Z i e , and the number of surviving BDCs in this region is i sur ,
e / i sur , and the default data collection price of the network is β * , then the initial data collection price of the i-th area is set as follows:
where ϕ is the price adjustment coefficient,L is the average value of L of all data collection areas, and L is the control threshold. After determining the initial data collection price β, SOs publishes tasks to different data collection areas and starts this round of data collection. In the data collection process, SOs adjust the price β according to the actual collection situation and profit. If the income of SOs in the last round is decreased, then SOs keep the original β to avoid reducing the data collection enthusiasm of BDCs. If the income of SOs is increased, then SOs lower β to get more profit. As mentioned in Section III. Part B, the adjustment of β is based on the actual difference between the amount of collected data and the expected amount of data. Assume in the i-th data collection area, the data volume that SOs expect to collect is Z i e , its actual collected data volume is Z i , and K is the velocity correction of β, then when the revenue of SOs increases, we continuously adjust β, and the correction function of β is as follows:
The initial setting and adjustment process of data collection price for SOs can be expressed by Algorithm 2. If each SO is used as an algorithm execution unit, the complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(Z).
B. SERVICE PRICING OF SOs
Service price refers to the payment given by users for the services provided by SOs. Users use a price and quality competition mechanism to purchase services. The better the quality and the lower the price, the more likely the service is purchased. Therefore, SOs should consider the profit and quality when determining the service price. In the network initialization, SOs sets a small initial price λ ini , and then calculates the possibility that the service is purchased based on the price and the actual quality of service. Then, calculate the profit of SOs theoretically, only when the profit reaches its expected level, the λ ini is taken as the real initial price. Otherwise, increase the value of λ ini and repeat the above process until the requirements are met.
Assuming that the initial service price set by SO a is λ ini , the possibility that users purchase the service of SO a without considering quality of service is:
ν is the adjustment factor, the higher the price of the service λ ini , the smaller the P Pri .
The Quality of Service (QoS) of SO a is determined by the data collected in the last round and cannot be changed. The more data collected by SO a , the higher the QoS of SO a provided. Assume that the amount of data collected by SO a is c , the Qos provided by SO a can be calculated as follows:
Therefore, without considering the service price, when the QoS of SO a is Q a , the possibility that users purchase the service of SO a is: (21), considering the QoS and price of SO a , the possibility of users purchasing the service of SO a is:
Eq. (22) is the relative probability that SO a is selected by users, that is, only considers the price and quality of SO a . As mentioned above, users use price and quality competition mechanisms to purchase services from multiple SOs. Therefore, the actual probability of SO a should consider other SOs. Assuming that there are N S SOs in the network, the actual possibilities for users to purchase the service of SO a is:
Suppose there are N u users in the network, and the cost of SO a in service processing is φ, the cost in data collection is β, the service price is λ ini , then the profit of SO a is:
Only when G (SO a ) is greater than the expected profit Gain set by SO a , the λ ini is adopted, otherwise the value of λ ini is increased and the above process is repeated until find a satisfied λ ini . The initial value of λ ini is small in the system initialization, and in the actual transaction process with users, SO a continuously adjust its λ to obtain a larger profit. Due to the adjustment of λ will affect service sales and the total profit. Therefore, we adopt the ''winners adjust and losers keep'' strategy. If increasing the value of λ not affect the sales volume and increase the total profit, we will continue to increase the value of λ in the next round. If the increase of λ makes the service sales volume and the overall profit reduce, then we keep the price of λ unchanged. Assuming that the cumulative profit of SO a in this round is G i , the profit of SO a in the last round is G i−1 , and the value of λ in the last round is λ * , then the adjusted service price is:
The initial setting and adjustment of service price for SOs can be represented by Algorithm 3. Since Algorithm 3 involves a double loop adjustment of λ, it has a higher complexity than the linear level and is less than or equal to the square level.
V. ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. EXPERIMENTAL SCENE SETTING
Default settings of the experimental scenarios in this paper are as follows: (1) There are 5 SOs, 560 BDCs, 500 Users and 5 AoIs in the network. 560 BDCs are randomly distributed in 5 areas to collect data periodically. Each SOs can purchase data from different BDCs and sell services to multiple users. (2) In the game and data transaction process, the initial price is set to: λ = 60, β = 25, µ = 8, c = 6, φ = 3, q = 1. (3) During the game, each BDC randomly chooses 10 BDCs as game opponents and plays 100 games with each opponent. After the games of 560 BDCs are completed, a round of game is ended. The initial trust level T k i of each node is 1, and the initial cooperative correction rate R cp of each node is 0. The game frequency of BDCs is adjusted after each round of game, and BDCs whose game frequency equal to 0 are marked as the death nodes. (3) Game strategy of BDCs are allocated by the system, and 16 kinds of game strategies are evenly distributed to 560 BDCs, wherein the strategy of BDC 1 −BDC 35 is ''0000'', the strategy of BDC 36 −BDC 70 is ''0001'', . . . , and so on, the number of BDCs of each strategy is 35. After each round of the game, the gamer strategy of each BDC is adjusted under the replicator principle. Figure 2 shows the trust level of BDCs under different game times. Figure 2(a) is the trust level after gaming 1000 times (1 round). Since BDC 1 −BDC 35 adopts the ALL-D (''0000'') strategy, the ''defect'' action is always taken by them during the game, so their trust level in Figure 2(a) is 0. Conversely, BDC 525 −BDC 560 adopts ALL-C (''1111'') strategy, so BDCs always cooperate with opponents in the game, so their trust level is always 1. For BDCs that adopt other strategies, their trust level is updated continuously with each time of game, and the trust level is roughly distributed in the range of 0.25-0.85. After the first round of game, BDCs adjust the game strategy based on the earnings in the last round. Their trust level in the second round is shown in Figure  2 (b). In Figure 2(b) , the trust level of BDC 1 − BDC 35 and Figure 2 (b), we can see that the trust level of BDCs is more stable and balanced. The trust level is basically maintained between 0.2-0.75, and the BDCs with a trust level of 0 or 1 are almost non-existent. This is because BDCs constantly adjust the game strategy with the increase of games and is closer to the favorable game strategy, and the game behavior of these better strategies is roughly determined, so the trust level of BDCs is more stable. Moreover, as the number of games increases, the trust level of BDCs is closer to a certain value, that is, the trust value corresponding to the better strategies. Figure 3 illustrates the number of surviving BDCs with the increase of games. During the game, BDCs gain profits or bear losses. After multiple games, BDCs that lose in the game die, and these BDCs no longer participate in the subsequent games. Therefore, the more games, the greater the difference in total profit between BDCs, and the more BDCs that die due to losses, the fewer BDCs survive. As shown in Figure 3 , the number of surviving BDCs decreases as the number of games increases. Figure 4 depicts the average data amount owned by BDCs under different game times. During the game, only when opponent BDCs take ''cooperate'' can BDCs obtain data. As can be seen from the figure, the data amount is increasing with the number of games, but its growth is not linear due to the uncertainty of game behaviors. Comparing these three rounds of game, it can be found that in the first round, the data growth is slow. Because game strategies of BDCs in the first round are allocated by the system, so there are some adopting the ''defect'' action, and game opponents cannot get extra data. In the second round, BDCs adjust game strategies based their profit. BDCs adopting the ALL-D strategy gain little profits because they cannot obtain additional data. These BDCs begin to adjust their strategies and take more aggressive behavior in the game. In the third round, as BDCs tend to adopt a more competitive game strategy and have game experience, BDCs are more inclined to ''cooperate'' in the game in exchange for the other party's data, so this round of data growth is faster. Figure 5 shows the distribution of games under different rounds of game. The total number of games increases with the rounds, but its growth is not linear. Although in the network initialization, each node games 1000 times (10 opponents, 100 games with each opponent), but with the increase in the rounds of games, some BDCs die due to losses, so the total number of games does not grow linearly. Here, we call the ''defect'' of both the initiator and the responder as the defect game, and the case where they both take the ''cooperate'' is cooperated game, and the one side ''defect'' and the other side ''cooperate'' called the half-cooperation game. In the defect game, half-cooperation game and cooperation game, the number of half-cooperation games is more numerous, followed by defect game, and the number of cooperation games is the slowest. Figure 6 shows the payment given by BDCs for the data obtained in the game. µ is set to a large value at first to attract more opponents. As the number of games increases, the value of µ constantly reduces to make more profit. When the value of µ is reduced to a certain extent, it can no longer be reduced, because when the value of µ is lower than the cost of collecting data, the game opponent is not profitable during the game, and the probability of betrayal of the opponent is increased. So, as the number of games increases, the value of µ increasingly approach the equilibrium point of price. As shown in Figure 6 , the initial setting of µ is 8. As the number of games increases, the value of µ decreases continuously. When the number of games reaches 500, the price adjustment of µ becomes small and gradually closer to the stable price. Corresponding to Figure 6 , the game profit of BDCs in Figure 7 increases with the decrease of the payment. In the former 500 games, the price of µ is adjusted faster, so the profit of BDCs increases faster. When µ gradually approaches the equilibrium point, its price, so its price and profit remain stable.
B. PARAMETERS AND PRICES OF BDCS
C. GAME STRATEGY Figure 8 gives the percentage of survival BDCs under different game strategies. Figure 8(a) is the proportion of each game strategy after 1000 games. This is the first adjustment of the game strategy by BDCs. The proportion of BDCs in each game strategy is 6.25% in network initialization, after the first Figure 9 shows the number of BDCs in different data collection areas. BDCs are randomly distributed in 5 areas, and the number of BDCs in Area 1-Area 5 is 60, 170, 112, 125, and 93. With the increase of data collection rounds and game times, the loss BDCs are increasing, the data of the survival BDCs is decreasing. Based on the number of BDCs in each region in Figure 9 , SOs determines the amount of data that each region needs to collect in the next round. As shown in Figure 10 , the number of data collection in each area corresponds to its BDCs, the area with more BDCs allocates more data, and the area with a small number of BDCs allocates less data. And Figure 10 gives the actual amount of data collected in each region. The actual collected data is much higher than the expected amount of data. This is because, in addition to the data collected by BDCs, each BDCs exchanges data through the game, so although BDCs no longer collect large amounts of data when the actual amount of data reaches the expected amount of data, their total data volume is still growing. Figure 11 shows the corresponding initial data collection price of each area according to the specific allocation data amount and the number of BDCs when the network default payment is set to 25 and 35. As can be seen from the figure, the initial price of each area is different. When there is less BDCs in an area, in order to stimulate BDCs to collect data to ensure the integrity and comprehensiveness of the data, the data collection price of corresponding area is higher than the average value, such as Area 1. When there are more BDCs in an area, we think that the data is more likely to be collected in this area due to BDCs need to collect data to maintain survival. At this time, we reduce the initial price of this area. It can be seen from Figure 11 that the model proposed in this paper is spatially differentiated from BDCs when formulating the initial price of data collection, and it is flexible and consistent with the reality of data collection network rules.
D. PARAMETERS FOR DIFFERENT AOI
E. PARAMETERS AND PRICES OF SOs
Figure 12- Figure 14 shows the data collection price, number of BDCs and data amount of each SO in 20 rounds. As can be seen from Figure 12 , the initial data collection price of the SO1-SO5 is different, in which SO2 gives the highest payment, and SO4 gives the lowest payment. In the price adjustment process, we adopt the principle of ''lose-stay, wincontinue''. When a SO is profitable in one round, we will lower its data collection price in the next round to obtain more profit. If a SO lose, we keep its price unchanged. Therefore, as can be seen from Figure 12 , in the first 15 rounds, since the data collection price of SO2 is the highest, more BDCs collect data for SO2, and SO2 obtains more data and profit, so it keeps decreasing the data collection price. On the contrary, the initial pricing of SO4 is not attractive enough for BDCs, so its profit in the previous 11 rounds has been below average, and it has kept the initial price unchanged. As the high price continues to decrease and the low price remains the same, in the 16 rounds, the prices of the five SOs are adjusted to be close to the same level, and the payments between SOs are not much different. Figure 13 is the number of BDCs owned by SOs. Corresponding to Figure12, the number of BDCs of SOs increases with the increase of rounds. Note that here is the total number of BDCs owned by SOs. Since BDCs are profitable through data collection, if the price given by SOs can make BDCs profitable, BDCs will help SOs collect data, but as shown in Figure 12 , SOs reduces its data collection price gradually, therefore, when the data collection price set by SOs reaches the cost of BDCs, it will not be able to attract new BDCs to collect data for them. Therefore, after several rounds, the quantity of BDCs of each SO is fixed. Figure 14 shows the growth of data of SOs. Since SO2 gives the highest payment for collecting data, it attracts the most BDCs for collecting data, so it has the largest amount of data. In contrast, SO4 has the lowest number of BDCs and the least amount of data due to the low data collection price. Obviously, the amount of data and the number of BDCs of SOs are affected by the data collection price. Therefore, the initial setting of the data collection price of SOs is quite critical. Figure 14 , as can be seen from Figure 15 , although the data collection price of SOs is slightly different, the overall trend is that the payment is continuously reduced, and with the increase of game rounds, the price is slowly stabilizing, which means that the price adjustment under this model can make the price reach a balance point. Figure16-Figure 17 is basically the same as SOs in 20 rounds. When the network runs several rounds, the number of BDCs each SOs has is stable. As the rounds increase, the difference of data amount o between SOs is even greater. Figure 18 - Figure 21 is the key parameters regarding service selling price of SOs. Figure 18 is about the possibility of purchase of each SOs. Among them, Figure 18(a) is the possibility that users based on service selling price may purchase their services. As can be seen from Figure 19 , the data selling price made by SO2 is the most expensive, followed by SO3, SO5, SO1, and the data selling price of SO4 is the cheapest. Due to the price and QoS competition mechanism adopted by users, the higher the price of SOs, the less likely the service is purchased without considering QoS. Therefore, as shown in Figure 18 (a), the possibility of SO4 is the highest, while the possibility of SO2 is the smallest. Figure 18(b) analyzes the purchasing possibilities based on the quality of service provided by SOs. In Figure 13 - Figure 17 , we give the number and amount of BDCs owned by each SO. Since the QoS of SOs is determined by the number of BDCs and the amount of data, SO2 has the highest QoS. In addition, as the data collection price of SOs decreases, the amount of BDCs and the amount of data it owns is gradually fixed, and their QoS is stabilized after a certain number of rounds. Considering the price and QoS of SOs, the purchasing possibility of each SOs is shown in Figure 18 (c) . Figure 19 shows the service selling price of SOs. During initialization, SOs will set a smaller selling price and attract more users. Then SOs slowly increase service prices to increase their total profit. The service selling price of SO2 is set to the highest, so in Figure 20 , it has the fewest number of users, because users will choose SOs with cheaper selling price. Figure 21 illustrates the total profit of SOs. As can be seen from the figure, although SO2 has more data and better QoS, its service selling price is too high, so users who purchase its service are rarely, its total profit is not as good as SO4 and VOLUME 7, 2019 SO1. SO4 has the lowest data selling price, and its data collection cost is the least. Therefore, its overall profit is the highest. Overall, the profit difference between SOs under this model is not very large. This is because we constantly adjust the network price of each SO and BDC.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a game-based economic model which can be applied to Cyber-physical-social systems for smart price decisions. This model can simulate price decising and gaming process in the real world. For BDCs, they can be competitive in the game by adjusting game parameters such as trust level, cooperative correction rate, game frequency and game strategy. Meanwhile, we propose a dynamic game matrix by improving the classical game matrix, which can describe the game income changes of BDCs in real time. For SOs, this model presents the initial setting and adjustment algorithms for data collection price and selling price based on multi trade-off to increase the competitiveness of SOs in users. Secondly, BDCs and SOs can find the most suitable game strategy and price adjustment principle through this model, and can approach the equilibrium point quickly, thus maximizing their profits. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed model can help SOs develop an optimized price, and let BDCs choose the appropriate competition strategy to help them to be competitive in price competition, which has significance in applications.
In future works, we will consider the regulation of regional total budget and expenditure, and establish the calculation model to strengthen the differentiated control of regions. 
